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Cultivating reason and civility as a moral priority requires our attention as world alliances 
promoting peace, security, and human dignity are breaking down revealing the often immoral 
underbelly of nations and of national leaders. Our world has grown closer together due to modern 
technology, and, in a way, further apart, as a diversity of values is spread unevenly within nations 
and throughout the world. Seeking common or shared values, especially moral values, is needed, 
requiring political and personal transparency, but remains in short supply. Experience has shown 
that the assumptions we bring to moral discourse are often undisclosed causing confusion and often 
the collapsing of open dialogue. We learn from E.A. Burtt (1965, 28 ff.) that presuppositions are the 
given – the intuitively given – we present to reality that in turn modify reality and become reality 
itself. And we tend to shape our moral views, perhaps unaware of their cultural origins, by our own 
cultural genealogy. Presuppositions as culture are the “there” that is “there” but not-yet fully or 
intentionally realized or openly stated. We know about these presuppositions through the language 
of discourse and argument, but ever so often they remain hidden and protected so as not to reveal 
their intended consequences. 
 Our assumptions about value have a motivational quality pushing us to discover the causal 
links that complete the theory our presuppositions entail. This dynamic relativity calls for discussion 
– a dialectic of conversation – for agreement and consistency to be sustained. When we transfer this 
conversation to morals and ethics we notice that the suppositions we bring to the table when 
answering the question “Why should I be moral?” often determine the answers we give. Thus, if we 
are truly interested in locating our shared values, transparency is required. As we know, hidden 
motives – of individuals and nations – more often than not corrupt the search for ethical and moral 
comity. 
To this conversation the theist brings his or her belief in God as law-giver and moral judge; the 
pragmatist, being oriented to science, recognizes that ethics lies outside of his or her method to 
procure and provides practical, social, reasons for being ethical, the politician often brings the hidden 
desire for manipulation and control, and the psychologist makes an effort to penetrate the human 
mind assuming the existence of an innate moral compass although often explained sociologically and 
developmentally. But what motivates either to pursue ethics remains hidden, lurking in the 
background of their beliefs and, perhaps, future hope. Moral knowledge remains elusive, but most 
agree that it is worth pursuing. 
This paper acknowledges these pursuits and difficulties.  As this paper will show, values are 
primarily cultural and/or social constructs orienting us to pre-conceived futures, difficult to change 
and discuss openly. Because we have been given a mixed bag evidenced by human diversity and moral 
pluralism, open dialogue is needed and cultivated civilly. Hence, this paper makes a case for dialogic 
civility as a means of communication and values adjudication understanding that communication 
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will remain closed unless someone steps up and begins to open such dialogue. Entailed by this is that 
ethics, morals, and civility are more than theoretical concerns; they imply social relationships 
immersed in cultural diversity, are person oriented, and are needed for world repair. 
Candace Carnicelli (2019) Director, Common Peace Center for the Advancement of 
Nonviolence says, “Knowledge strengthens our conviction and deepens our wisdom and 
understanding. It opens up our mind – presents choices we did not previously know we had – allows 
for previously unknown possibilities to be birthed. It is a power that allows us to release fear – fear 
of the unknown.” She quotes Martin Luther King, Jr, who said, “The function of education is to 
teach one to think intensely and to think critically. Intelligence plus character – that is the goal of 
true education.” As David Brooks (2016, 183) advises, “Character development, like historic 
progress, best happens imperceptibly, through daily effort.” And daily effort is sorely needed. Thus, 
dialogic (rational) discussions of ethics and values is recommended as a way of seeking commonly 
shared values and building a more civil and ethical society. 
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Identity Markers: From Whence Came Our Values? 
What Lies Behind The Righteous Mind? 
Noticeably, every nation, like every person, has certain identity markers. These often include 
power, position, education, and wealth, to name a few. Nationally they come in the form of GDP, 
trade surpluses or deficits, a powerful military, a strong workforce, and identifying with either 
capitalism or socialism, possibly both, etc. Identify markers differentiate our values, point to their 
foundation, and hint at the undisclosed principles lurking just beneath the surface of our words and 
actions. They identify persons and groups – religious bodies, political parties, and nations. What is 
beneath these identity markers, often left unsaid, are ideals definitive of our deepest, most cherished 
beliefs. We are sometimes fooled by identity markers because we fail to look behind the words used, 
only to the actions of persons and groups. Unarticulated value assumptions are often hidden in plain 
sight. 
Richard Rorty (1979, xxxi) correctly observed that the ideas and arguments of philosophers, 
theologians, educators, and scientists are embedded in a morass of unstated beliefs and assumptions. 
The clarity of their statements, the logic of their arguments, and the axiomatic assumptions guiding 
their theories provide only an illusion of objectivity. So, we ask, “What is it that motivates our moral 
perspicacity?” and “Why aren’t people and groups more transparent about their beliefs and 
assumptions?” An example is the recent vote of the United Methodist Church to maintain their 
“traditional” view of the LBGTQ community. That is, although such individuals are welcomed in 
the church, the church will not hire them as ministers or elders, ordain them, or perform same-sex 
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marriages. Hidden just underneath the surface of this decision is the view, mostly taken from the 
Old Testament and then written into the Methodist Book of Discipline, that homosexuality is a sin. 
To clarify the picture of value-markers, Johnathan Haidt (2012, 146 ff.), in his book The 
Righteous Mind, has identified some of the basic identity markers of moral life. He calls these 
“universal cognitive modules upon which cultures construct moral matrices.” These motivators are 
identified as care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation. Haidt also calls these constructs “adaptive challenges” and indeed they are as 
the last two markers can easily be applied to the Methodist decision and perhaps bring some clarity 
to their resolution. Haidt’s analysis is steeped in sociological insight supported by psychological 
interpretations from which much can be learned. 
Haidt, being the psychologist that he is, begins his dissertatum by probing the origin of moral 
values. He concludes that each of the above foundations has an innate beginning; meaning, “being 
in advance of experience” (Haidt 2012, 178). He calls his proposal “an educated guess”: “Particular 
rules and virtues vary across cultures, so you’ll get fooled if you look for universality in the finished 
books. You won’t find a single paragraph that exists in identical form in every human culture. But if 
you look for links between evolutionary theory and anthropological observations, you can take some 
educated guesses about what was in the universal first draft of human nature” (178). Being unsure 
what he means by “the universal first draft of human nature,” we can only wonder what undisclosed 
assumptions lie behind this statement. Certainly, “being in advance of experience” requires a moral 
thorough explication. 
The evidence is thin as Haidt’s observation hangs on his initial scrutiny of young children 
about whom he believes evolutionary forces have brought them into some kind of primitive moral 
awareness. Left unsaid is whether these foundations are biologically innate or intuitions built 
through human experience. Although he gives “intuition” and “innate” the same meaning – “being 
in advance of experience” -- his “cognitive modules” bare the stamp of sociological analysis and his 
proposal appears to be developed more on the structure and functioning of human society, on 
patterns of social relationships, social interaction, and the habits of everyday life than on some kind 
of innate biological moral intelligence. To move around this quandary, he says, “…I call my theory 
the ‘social intuitionist model of moral judgment’.” For Haidt, moral sentiments originate as 
intuitions, innate and evolutionary, and appear later in life when cognition (reasoning) is applied to 
them (56-57). 
We should point out that many researchers are concerned with combining epistemological 
considerations – that there is such a thing as “moral knowledge,” especially innate moral knowledge 
– and viewing children as possessing moral capacities not solely imposed by their enculturation. 
Elliot Turiel remarks, “The development of social knowledge in children and adolescents is a broad 
topic requiring some choices regarding the focus of analysis. These choices are naturally guided by 
one’s theoretical orientation to social reasoning and its formation and transformation in the process 
of growth. My research … has led me to focus on categories of social reasoning…the analysis of 
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categories of social knowledge have provided a framework for an understanding of children’s social 
interactions with peers, their relationship with adults, their processes of development, and the 
relationships between social judgments and actions.” Turiel’s thesis is “that social life is guided by 
rational processes and that the construction of fundamental and distinct categories of social 
knowledge begins early in childhood.” His assumptions do not contradict those of Haidt’s, as he side 
steps the issue of innateness, only to stress the importance of social interactions and the need to 
cultivate reason and civility (Turiel 2008, vii). 
 
We All Wonder 
Thus, there is much to unpack in Haidt’s thesis as well as how moral/social knowledge 
develops. We all wonder whom we are and from whence we came. There is some mystery to this as 
we had nothing to do with our conception. But, here we are complete with our genetic and cultural 
past, trying to unwind our “self” in all its mysterious dimensions. Having been born, reared, and 
educated in the American South, history is of great importance to me. Yet, even though I can trace 
much of my surface life, the origins of my thoughts and values and how they came to be what they 
are remains vague and unidentified. Decisions were made to bring us into life and these decisions 
connect us to myriad ancestors far and wide. Who were these ancestors of mine? What was their 
conceptual make-up and how did their values impact my life? How did their mores seep into my 
genetic, evolutionary, development, if indeed they did? Is Haidt correct? Was I born with a built-in 
moral sensitivity? Why are some individuals pathological killers; what was built into the first draft of 
their human nature? Can universal conclusions to Haidt’s assumptions be empirically reached? 
Mine is not a fruitless wondering, for in me, as in others, are hidden values captured and 
convoluted within my genetic/social makeup. These are perhaps cultural implants difficult to define 
and even more difficult to dislodge and bring into rational inspection. As Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1958, 50) has commented, “The aspect of things that are most important for us are hidden because 
of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before 
one’s eyes) The real foundation of his enquiry does not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at 
sometime struck him.—and this means we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and 
powerful.” Wittgenstein seems to be saying that our values are hidden in “plain sight”; perhaps they 
are. 
Because values are deep-rooted, often concealed just beneath the surface of rationality, their 
origin is of some mystery. Haidt’s is one thesis proposed to clarify this quandary. But, are they natural 
(innate) and modified by experience, or are cultual and environmental factors their source 
rather than unmodified psychological or personal characteristics? Given that values lie quietly 
within, often just underneath the surface of rational thought, through time and socialization some 
become instinctive and when reinforced, authoritarian. Obviously, they appear innate, but no MRI 
can reveal these inherent features and neither can they be denied. The way we talk and think and the 
decisions we make are not only products of family, nurture, and education, but are artifacts duly 
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embedded by our ancestral history. And all of these values are not “righteous” or “moral” as Haidt 
assumes them to be. Richard Rorty (1999, 173) thus warns against seeking a “source of moral 
knowledge.” He argues that “knowledge is justified true belief” and recommends replacing subject-
centered morality with communicative reasoning. Following the insights of Jürgen Habermas, Rorty 
says, “…that is why, in the public square of a pluralistic democracy, justification is always up for 
grabs, and why the term ‘source of moral knowledge’ will always be out of place.” 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967, 1-3) also provide a clue to this quandary when 
saying “that reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the 
processes in which this occurs.” They point out, “Sociological interest in questions of ‘reality’ and 
‘knowledge’ is thus initially justified by the fact of their social relativity.” Not to throw away our 
biological evolution, we have been provided with some biological advantages, special organs of 
equilibrium, as noted by psychologist Jean Piaget (1967, 102). Piaget explained, “This is true of 
mental life, whose organs of equilibrium are special regulatory mechanisms. This is so at all levels of 
development, from the elementary regulators of motivation (needs and interests) up to will for 
affectivity and from perceptual and sensori-motor regulations up to operations for cognition.” This 
seems to correlate with Haidt’s view of “being innate,” but correlation doesn’t imply identity, only 
resemblance. Both Haidt and Piaget are using metaphors to explain what is unseen, only assumed. 
“Identity” and “correlation” are not equivalent. 
Strangely vague is Piaget’s notion of “will for affectivity.” This feeling (will, desire) – affectivity 
– can be positive, open-minded, amiable, and helpful, or unpleasant and damaging to sociability. 
Obviously, these “special organs of equilibrium” do not have some identified consistent moral 
content – an “ought” deeply embedded in their “is.” This is not clearly articulated by Piaget or Haidt. 
Internal social regulators can be positive social inter-actors – in tune with moral precepts – or 
negative, blocking civil interactions and even being irrational. Evolution has surely provided the 
means for value (moral) identification and regulation, but the natural world remains morally neutral. 
No doubt Darwin (Haidt 2012, 56) thought our values had an evolutionary modus operandi, but 
offered no biological proof of such.  
Piaget (1967, 58) adds, “To the extent that the emotions become organized, they emerge as 
regulations whose final form of equilibrium is none other than the will. Thus, the will is the true 
affective equivalent of the operations of reason. Will is a late-appearing function. The real exercise 
of will is linked to the function of the autonomous moral feelings, which is why we have waited until 
this [late-childhood] stage to discuss it.” Many agree that we must choose (will) to be rational as 
Piaget suggests, but to say our moral feelings are autonomous – self-directed and independent – 
seems to deny their social construction. Surely Piaget is letting his psychological assumptions guide 
his observations and conclusions. “Will” or “the expression of what we desire to happen” does not 
presuppose “what we desire to ‘morally’ happen.” “Will” becomes linked to moral feelings or amoral 
feelings as experience and the socialization process moves forward. Likewise, as children grow into 
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maturity, they are able to provide reasons for their moral judgments, reasons for their wants, likes, 
and dislikes. 
Thus, to say that our moral discernment is purely evolutionary or biological (innate) or 
autonomous ignores an additional observation of Piaget; namely, that “Will is late-appearing” and 
of Berger and Luckmann that moral knowledge is socially constructed. People desire many things, 
living morally rather than selfishly or otherwise is just one choice made in life. We continue to grow 
and exchange our ideas and thoughts with others, produce offspring that carry much of whom we 
are and what they will become. And there is more; birthing within, developing our thoughts and 
values, is a process of continuous learning and adjustment. This is a sociological, enculturation 
process, a process by which we learn the traditional content of a culture and assimilate its practices 
and values. 
 
Social Control and Practical Reasoning 
So, here I sit thinking and writing but unaware of the vastness of the genetic and social 
processes bringing me to this point in my life. This is a philosopher’s nightmare as objectivity is 
always the goal of philosophical proclivity. But objectivity and even subjectivity melt in the vast, 
perhaps ambiguous, nature of whom we are—our intrinsic self about which we only get a peek now 
and then. Johnathan Haidt tries to clarify this picture, and does shed light on some basic moral 
constructs of social interaction, but appears to convolute biological innateness with evolutionary 
social development; these are not easily separated. There are others who dismiss the intrinsic 
altogether (Rorty, 1999, 50-51; 120; 263) considering it being too unsteady and ill-defined for moral 
theory building. This is understandable as science and technology have pushed us into a fact-based 
culture-seeking epistemological security. But, such security will not be found as our pre-rational 
dispositions color our decision-making, even the decision to be rational (See: Hester 1975). So dare 
I suggest we peek under the covers of our thoughts and decisions and therein exhume the hidden 
values that are regenerative and illusive? This is conceivably an impossible task, but not completely 
so, as we can explore many of the hidden assumptions, motives, and unwary messages from the past 
forming our present cognitive dispositions and why we act the way we do. This is a major insight of 
Haidt’s work, but, as we are aware, the origin of an idea in no way constitutes its validation. The pre-
verbal and pre-rational assumptions we bring to the table of human discourse and to our ethical 
behavior is a snarl of cultural habits and presuppositions that are difficult to untangle. 
Moralities, and there are many, are special forms of social control and practical reasoning the 
purpose of which is to supply action-guidance for individuals in a social context. This is both a 
prudential and rational conclusion relying not on psychological metaphysics, but life’s experiences. 
It is within social contexts that one encounters the problem of trying to determine what “is the “best” 
thing to do.” In common language, this problem takes the form of knowing what is right and being 
able to distinguish right from wrong behavior. Thus, the crucial question for morality becomes, 
“Should I do what is right and refrain from doing what is wrong?” not, “Do I have an innate more 
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sense?” Implied by this is that there exists conclusive reasons for doing what action, if it is right, and 
conclusive reasons against doing the action if it is wrong. This may just be an overstatement as 
conclusive reasons often disappear in the fog of cultural diversity. No innate – before experience – 
moral knowledge can resolve this problem. Morality is a form of social reasoning motivated by social 
hope. 
Social Hope 
There are hidden connections – connections and relationships that define whom we are and 
how we respond to others. These hidden connections can be revealed by reason but reason doesn’t 
create them. Our commitment to reason is itself a pre-rational commitment, a leap of affirmation 
pleading for consistency, contradiction avoiding, and pushing us into the future. Reason is a form 
of social equilibrium and is never as “pure” as some believe it to be. Noticing this uncertain quality, 
German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1986, xii) formulated what is called “the ontology of the not-yet,” 
which is important to his idea of “social hope” and has significance for science and ethics as 
inference-making activities. Bloch points out that “actual thought never moves in straight lines, like 
thought that is fixed, cut and dried, in which nothing expands or changes and which is therefore 
incapable of doing justice to transformation”(xiii). Bloch’s formulation reads, “P is not-yet Q” 
(strictly, “If P, then not-yet Q”) and explains his commitment to avoid any possible closure to the 
dialectical interchange between individuals or groups of individuals. With this Bloch says “this 
forward-pressing urge latent in every moment is hope” (xiii). 
Social hope implies a vision of the not-yet and cannot be contained in logical inference only or 
in un-exhumed assumptions and ideas. The openness of hope is revealed in the vision it embraces 
and vision is forward-looking where hope, ethical or otherwise, is activated in the existential moment 
of decision-making. More often than not, hope is situation dependent. Here hope finds meaning 
and musters the energy to move forward. Cultivating reason and civility hangs on social hope and 
our motivation to activate dialogical discussions that are open, fair-minded, and focused on shared 
moral values. Agreeing with Bloch, both science and ethics are built-up from yet-to-be tested 
hypothesis – the not-yet – the beliefs, hunches, and commitments we bring to both: from 
hypotheses that are yet-to-be tested (verified) empirically and in ethics from hypotheses that are yet-
to-be assessed by one’s experience in the social environment and what behaviors meet cultural 
expectations as to right and wrong behavior. 
Both science and ethics rely on conditional judgments, having an iffy quality about them with 
reference to that which has yet-to-be discovered and/or confirmed, the motives and unspoken values 
they entail, and, in ethics especially, to the decision or indecision of following a recognized ethical 
rule or intuitive ethical belief. Both involve interpretations of the real and recognized—the physical 
and the social nature of human living and the cultural expectations under which one lives. And 
although empiricism is the hallmark of science, what is unspoken and only assumed is as important 
as what is said and placed in theoretical discourse. Be forewarned: just as we cannot build a secure 
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bridge from hope to certainty, neither can we build from science, a bridge from fact to value, from 
isness to oughtness. This is a fallacy inherent in moral psychology. 
Yet, Marc Hauser (2006), like Haidt, seeks a science of morality. He comments, “On the 
contrary, I argue that moral judgments are mediated by an unconscious process, a hidden moral 
grammar that evaluates the causes and consequences of our own and others’ actions.”1 Hauser says 
this shifts the burden of evidence (that we in fact have some sort of moral compass) “from a 
philosophy of morality to a science of morality.” This is an assumption requiring our attention. Is 
Hauser agreeing that morality is innate – an unconscious process – or is our hidden moral grammar 
built up through social connections, our ancestral heritage, and enculturation? This is unclear, but 
either way it entails a search for the “hidden grammar” of moral discourse, the unspoken 
assumptions that drive our conclusions. This we should consider in both ethics and science. 
To accept the causal relationship suggested by Haidt or Hauser at face value, between 
observing children and the inference that they possess an innate moral sense, may be an item of 
commonsense or perhaps a hidden assumption of psychology, but real life doesn’t always move in 
this way. Moral value varies from culture to culture and from person to person revealing their 
particular pre-rational beliefs and habits. We are often fooled by the decisions others make. 
Inference-making pushes us into Bloch’s “not-yet” about which there is an uncertain quality 
difficult to probe. Obviously, there is an inherent limit to reason as logic can note facts and infer 
relations, but cannot create either. Values and intrinsic motives or even so-called innate moral 
knowledge are inferences made, perhaps to confirm our own humanity, but their identity is always 
environmentally constructed, built or destroyed by relationships that are made and relationships 
that have failed. 
 
Moral Reasons: A Practical Approach 
Kurt Baier (1995) says the very purpose for entering into moral deliberation is to maximize 
the good life and seek the best possible course of action in one’s day-to-day activities and choices. 
Obviously, not all of one’s choices are moral ones, so what makes them moral? Baier points out that 
what makes one’s deliberations moral is the use of moral reasons. So, in Baier’s view, what are moral 
reasons? Baier says that moral deliberations take place if and only if choices and decisions are 
considered from the moral point of view. A person must adopt the point of view of morality if he or 
she is to be moral (Baier 1970, 331-333). He says the moral point of view is a standard of judgment 
by which individuals are called upon to weigh their convictions, sentiments, and assumptions about 
others. This standard looks at the world from the point of view of everyone recognizing that others 
too have a right to a worthwhile life. Obviously, in Baier’s view, morality stresses equality, fair-
treatment, and human decency. His definition of the “moral point of view” is a standard treating all 
people as  
 
equally important centers of craving, impulses, desires, needs, aims, and aspirations; as people with 
ends of their own, all of which are entitled, prima facie, to be attained. From this point of view everyone 
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of these individuals is required to modify his impulsive behavior, his endeavors and his plans by 
observing certain rules, the genuinely moral rules. (Baier 1970, 333) 
 
Given Baier’s view of morality and because moral rules are designed to facilitate conflicts of 
interests, reason is required for arbitration when conflicts occur. Baier (1982, 13) explains, 
 
Human beings are not, it is plain, born as moral agents. Everybody has to learn to become one. We 
could not learn this if we did not grow up in a society which has what is sometimes called the institution 
of morality. Such a society teaches its members the roles to be played in determining what people may 
in reason ask of one another and what such requests by others they may reject. The basic role is, of 
course, that of the moral agent trying to work out what morally speaking is wanted of him in the 
particular situation in which he finds himself. To be able to do this he must have learnt the skill of 
practical reasoning and the general directives which formulate what is generally wanted of a moral 
agent. Being a moral agent thus presupposes the roles of moral teacher and moral learner. But since the 
general moral directives or precepts, which the learner accepts from his teacher are not necessarily 
sound, he must also learn to play the role of moral critic or reformer, the role moral philosophers have 
paid most attention to. All the roles mentioned so far are concerned with answering the question of 
what, morally speaking, one ought to do. But there also are three other roles, those of the moral accuser, 
defender, and judge. They are concerned with ascertaining the quality of someone's performance as a 
moral agent, that is, with his performance of the cognitive task of judging what he ought to do, and 
the executive task of doing it, in short his moral merit--and over time, his virtue. The moral accuser 
accuses someone, himself or another, of having performed these tasks badly, the defender will come to 
his defense, and the judge will pass judgment on him. Of course, unlike a legal verdict, such a judgment 
is never final. 
 
Baier’s thesis is pragmatic and often called “the good reasons approach to moral justification” 
(Hudson 1983). It is supported by the observations of Elliot Turiel (2008) whose thesis is that 
children are molders of society as much as cultural receptors, that they generate social knowledge 
through their own social understandings and experiences. Turiel reminds us that cognitive and 
emotional development is a maturation process as well as an educational strategy. 
 
Reason and Civility 
It is socially important to connect reason with morality; broadly, to civility. Also, in order to 
enrich our own understanding of human life we are rationally and, perhaps morally, compelled to 
acknowledge the diverse values freely expressed in our communities. As acknowledged, seeking their 
origin is often a fruitless task, but seeking their hidden suppositions is necessary for fair-mindedness 
and transparency. We are reminded by Thomas Jefferson (1787) “to shake off all the fears of servile 
prejudices, under which weak minds are servilely crouched.” He said that we should, “Fix reason 
firmly in her seat, and call on her tribunal for every fact, every opinion” and “question with boldness 
even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 
 
114 
than that of blindfolded fear.” (Coffman, 2012) But how is this possible; that is, how do we unearth 
and then face up to the myriad values that define our lives? How do we even discover them, prioritize 
them from a moral perspective, and apply them in the public square? This remains an arduous task.  
Acknowledging Jefferson’s words, perhaps a fresh paradigm is needed for sorting out and 
prioritizing our values, and for transferring moral value to younger generations. In this search we 
should understand that the language freeing us to discuss and debate, dissent and support, can also 
constrict us. Dialogic civility is such a paradigm requiring open-mindedness, respect, and fair-
treatment. This is often a messy business reminding us that mass culture generously flushes out, and 
renders successfully vague, standards of rationality. Educator Alan Olson (2004, 36) comments, 
 
Today’s model of scientific rationality may be changing, but rationality itself remains important as a 
critical requirement for comprehension and maintaining dialogue with different cultures, a task 
impossible to carry out apart from rational reflection on basic values. Rationality provides the basic 
values and starting points of all systems, and for the openness of different cultural worlds in the 
dialogue and flow of information. 
 
As moral dialogue opens, there will be some uncertainty, a confusion of fact with value and a 
confusion of response with evaluation. A. S. Kling and L. A. Brothers (1992, 371-372) have warned 
that we often believe that our response is identical with our evaluation of whatever issues and 
problems we encounter. But ever so often our responses to social issues are irrational, coming from 
motives and values unarticulated and hidden deeply within our value histories. Objectivity is 
difficult, but reason calls it forth. Jordan B. Peterson (1999, 466) concurs saying that it is this 
confusion that has often proven a great detriment to moral and civil discourse noting that 
unarticulated values can be formulated as morally uplifting or constricting ideologies. It is to the 
later our attention is drawn. 
 
Constricting Ideologies 
Assessing the moral fabric of our lives or others, and our own biases is needed as we begin 
discussions of ethics and values. Acknowledging this will be uncomfortable as we all are beset with 
ongoing cultural ideologies definitive of whom we are and about which we hardly understand or 
admit. Yet, it’s not comfort we seek in discussions of morality, but an honest exchange of ideas and 
solutions to current moral problems. To break the ideological chain binding our thoughts and values 
and those of others will be difficult and many times disorienting, but this is where an honest 
assessment must begin. Acknowledgment is a step forward in this process. Acknowledging that 
entrenched beliefs, principles, creeds, and ideas are often couched in dogmatic truths daring others 
to challenge could open many dialogical doors. Of course, as our own moral narcissism is uncovered, 
negative and emotional – even pompous – reactions will often color the conversation. This we must 
try to avoid. In the age of social media, it seems that dialogical conversations would move forward, 
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but this hasn’t proven true. Social media is often used to promote personal and political ideologies 
and defame others as much as it is used for dialectical communication. 
Admittedly, much of one’s values-orientation is directed from the outside, by the ideas of 
politicians, ministers, friends, and family members. If outside pressures prevail, dialogue will break 
down and provincial values – often intrinsic and undisclosed – will be a wall separating and not 
producing the moral outcomes of community cohesion definitive of dignity, decency, and equality. 
As we are aware, faith and belief, as well as loyalty to various ideas and dogmas set the horizon of 
moral truth. To question a prized belief, is for many, to question life itself. Transformation from 
where we are to where we desire to be – to move from a morally confused present to an idealized 
moral future will be difficult and often mentally painful. 
Although claiming to express things as they are, ideologies are, in reality, a means of protecting 
and defending a particular point of view or situation. Ideology, no matter its substance or source, 
supports a moral superiority often negating positive value discussions. Objectivity may be the goal, 
but difficult to procure. “From this perspective,” comments Eric Shyman (2013, 317), “ideologies 
are, by nature, resistant to change, as they are almost always developed and applied from a protective 
standpoint—that is to preserve a system that is to be defended by a particular group.” This is best 
expressed by Dean Price who, when talking about America’s early pioneers, demonstrated the birth 
of an ideology. Price said, “The people that built the roads followed the animal paths. And once that 
path is set, it takes a tremendous amount of effort and energy to take another path. Because you get 
in that set pattern of thinking, and it’s passed down generation to generation to generation.” (Packer 
2013, 10) Socialization, the process of learning to behave in a way that is acceptable to society, when 
set in, is difficult to dislodge. 
Students in Florida and around the United States are aware of this as they have called for “gun 
control” and perhaps revising the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution. They are sensitive to the 
values of their parents and, if they are religious, the values taught in their churches. This sensitivity 
often biases their understanding and their objectivity, but not always. Many are reaching beyond 
this cultural horizon to a more holistic and inclusive ethical view. The pressures are many and the 
growing pains severe. Taking this into consideration, attention needs to be given to the language 
used in moral discourse as there can be a slippery slope effect to what has been labeled “political 
correctness,” “moral relativity,” and “identity politics.” Often complex, blocking open and honest 
discourse, these can be engines of “unchanged,” constricting moral vision. Troubling is, with overt 
and self-inflicted sensitivity, many in our public schools and universities have sacrificed the search 
for truth filling their classrooms with sympathy, warmth, and ungarnished understanding rather 
than hard-hitting and fact-checking dialectical discussions characteristic of exposing false beliefs and 
eliciting truth. Moral relativity is often the result, with everyone – students and teachers – happy 
that “their” truth is left unaffected and everyone feels good about themselves. 
About this, Richard Rorty (1999, 276) comments, 
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Insofar as ‘postmodern’ philosophical thinking is identified with a mindless and stupid cultural 
relativism – with the idea that any fool thinking that calls itself culture is worthy of respect – than I 
have no use for such thinking. But I do not see that what I have called ‘philosophical pluralism’ entails 
any such stupidity. The reason to try persuasion rather than force, to do our best to come to terms with 
people whose convictions are archaic and ingenerate, is simply that using force, or mockery, or insult, 
is likely to decrease human happiness.  
We do not need to supplement this wise utilitarian counsel with the idea that every culture has some 
intrinsic worth. We have learned the futility of trying to assign all cultures and persons places on a 
hierarchical scale, but this realization does not impugn the obvious fact that there are lots of cultures 
we would be better off without, just as there are lots of people we would be better off without. To say 
that there is no such scale, and that we are simply clever animals trying to increase our happiness by 
continually reinventing ourselves, has no relativistic consequences. The difference between pluralism 
and cultural relativism is the difference between pragmatically justified tolerance and mindless 
irresponsibility. 
 
What Rorty points out is the unreality within the reality of the values-muddle we are today 
experiencing. Many are asking if there are universal principles definitive of “morality” and, if so, 
what are they. They often look to their parents, teachers, and religious leaders for support. And be 
put on guard, practices prevalent in our society such as political correctness and moral relativity, 
including an appeal to our heritage, could just be the patina concealing the hidden biases through 
which Constitutional rights are defined and defended. This I believe is what Olson (2004) meant 
when he said that culture often renders successfully vague common standards of rationality. 
Johnathan Haidt (2012, 132-133) appears to confer, as he comments, 
 
Neither Shweder (1993, 360-365) nor I am saying that ‘anything goes,’ or that all societies or all cuisines 
are equally good. But we believe that moral monism—the attempt to ground all of morality on a single 
principle—leads to societies that are unsatisfying to most people and at high risk of becoming 
inhumane because they ignore so many other moral principles. … To understand why people are so 
divided by moral issues, we can start with an exploration of our common evolutionary heritage, but 
we’ll also have to examine the history of each culture and the childhood socialization of each individual 
within that culture. 
 
Sensitivity to Differences 
Care needs to be taken, as gender, race, sexuality, nationality, and social status are sensitive 
matters that draw our concern. Other than gun control, the status of immigrants, the right to 
protest, and religious freedom are additional issues that will drag hidden biases from under the cover 
of “being rational.” The “culture wars” of some thirty years ago have not gone away as they too have 
taken on a political recasting. (See: Hunter, 1990 and Wuthnow, 1989) For example, with two 
alleged extramarital affairs looming over the presidency in 2019, white evangelicals are doubling 
down on their support for Donald Trump. But the political gains their support is yielding may come 
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at a high cost for the future of their faith. A new survey released in April 2018 by PRRI (Public 
Religion Research Institute) finds white evangelical support for Trump remains strikingly high, 
with 75 percent holding a favorable view of the president and only 22 percent holding an 
unfavorable view. This level of support far exceeds his favorability among all Americans, which is at 
42 percent. Among all non-white evangelical Americans, Trump’s favorability is only 36 percent.2 
Strange as this may sound from a moral perspective, religion has become another source of 
diversity rather than a unifying force in America life. The variety of religious beliefs today surpasses 
the nation’s multitude of ethnicities, nationalities, and races. With the advances in immigration from 
both Spanish speaking countries and from the Far East, America, which was once thought of as a 
cultural/moral melting pot, may resemble broken shards in 2019 rather than a grand blend of 
religious diversity, dignity, and decency. This is true even though the vast majority of Americans – 
76 percent – identify themselves as Christian. It remains that 16 percent of Americans are 
unaffiliated with any faith, and 1/3 of the self-identified Christians are unaffiliated with any church. 
(See: Caplow, et. al., 2000) As the church’s influence has weakened in American life, what other 
source of value and morality will take its place? 
 
Cultivating Civility 
To identify the relationships among moral beliefs expressed in religions, politics and laws, 
especially Constitutional laws, is a major challenge of moral thinking. This needs to be accomplished 
before alternative solutions to important social problems are recommended. Understanding our 
emersion in a diverse society, moral, civil, and legal consistency are vital to the political health of the 
country. This is not an intuitive overreach; commonsense tells us that. A productive first step is to 
examine the moral premises of American culture for no dialogue about American values is possible 
without a set of common moral assumptions. This does not imply the standardization of morality 
or the death of individualism, only that we are challenged to identify moral assumptions comprising 
our diversity that are able to unify our relationships and consistently guide our behavior when 
immersed in moral conflict situations. 
To identify a new value-paradigm that includes an evaluation of our values and seek a 
common moral point of view, we need to proceed slowly and patiently. Time and effort are required 
to effectively interact with ideas such as “democracy,” “inalienable rights,” “the rights of minorities,” 
and “dialogic civility.” Furthermore, we should remain sensitive to gender equality, the LGBTQ 
community, and religion and race inclusion. Some will be open to dialogue on these issues, others 
will not. No innate moral sense can correct this problem. Cognitive and emotional development is 
a maturation process and, admittedly, many in our society demonstrate a deficiency in this regard. 
It will be an arduous task to uncover the hidden assumptions of social knowledge. 
Democracy—a working principle for American government and American schools—is 
founded on the values of freedom, justice, fairness, integrity, honesty, responsible behavior, and the 
rule of law. But, be forewarned, as Thomas Jefferson said, “Though [the people] may acquiesce, they 
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cannot approve what they do not understand.” (Coffman 2012) Understanding and application 
ought to be our goals. And this is conceivably a moral “ought” weighed by history and deep 
consideration. My thesis is simple: cultivating reason and civility ought to be a moral priority in 
schools, churches, government, and community organizations. Thus, care must be taken and 
attention given to the meaning of these principles, including the skills required for their application 
in value disputes. Surely, the violence that has now pervaded American life and especially its schools 
demands such reconsideration. Also, with a President constantly sending mixed value messages, 
reason and objectivity are needed. 
 
Conclusion: Democracy, Our Mooring to Reason and Civility 
Moral Foundations 
In the more than two hundred years of American democracy, Constitutional safeguards, 
although living documents and not absolutes, have provided a buffer between the majority and 
minorities, the rich and poor, and those with an expansive education and those whose education is 
limited. These safeguards only work when they are enforced by people of strong moral character. 
But one must be aware as corporate creed, the hidden agenda of political pundits, and those using 
social media for unethical and undemocratic purposes are disruptive to moral and democratic 
development. A hidden assumption lying at the foundation of democracy is the requirement for 
honesty, responsibility, and fair-mindedness. These are pre-requisites for a working democratic 
culture. A study of ethics will reveal the blurred edges of morality and moral principles. It is along 
these edges where discussion will find meaning and importance and were dialogue is needed. Thus, 
we need mental and physical room, a forum, in which we can explore atypical ideas and avenues of 
action, and express our opinions in a non-coercive or intimidating setting. We need a place to 
examine beliefs, values and practice civility in the give-and-take of differences of opinion and the 
rational interchange of ideas. From this perspective, democracy as a moral principle must be 
preserved. Democracy is our mooring to reason and civility. 
Willing engagement in such conversations will build connections to our cultural histories, 
especially our religious or nonreligious histories. Here we can begin to unearth the hidden 
assumptions and prejudices hopefully brought freely for open discussion. These connections will 
add ethical perspective in a world beset with mixed value-messages. For example, what value-
messages were received when hearing about or reading about the demonstrations, protests, and 
violence in the August 2017 encounters in Charlottesville, Virginia? What value-messages were 
received from political leaders or from the clergy? Were these discussed with friends, teachers, and 
parents? Did Christian ministers place these within the context of Jesus’ moral advice—to love 
others as we love ourselves? Were there mixed message in these exchanges resulting in values 
confusion? More often than not, it is along these distorted edges were meaning and understanding 
will be found. All of these represent open moral wounds in our historical past. Until these wounds 
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are cleaned out and disinfected with truth and moral knowledge, there will be no chance for healing.  
About the wisdom needed for intellectual and moral growth James L. Christian (2007, xix) writes, 
 
In a sense, intellectual growth happens to us; it is not something that we do. But it happens to us only 
when our minds are given a chance to operate on their own terms. They take their own time to process 
information and begin developing a web of interconnecting lines of illumination among their material 
… Only disciplined study with an open mind will produce philosophic awareness. Insight and 
consciousness still come only with relentless labor. In this age of instant everything; there is no instant 
wisdom, unfortunately. 
 
Many have lost contact with the moral foundations of democracy, and there has been a 
diminished cultivation of reason in schools stemming from an educational system that relies on fact-
based teaching and constrained thinking. Problem solving, concept analysis, and creative thinking 
are essential tools for morally responsible behavior. Vladislav Lektorsky (2004, 51 ff.) concurs,  
 
This kind of education is an important means of cultivating moral and civic virtues because many 
people cannot make political and moral judgments, cannot argue their positions, cannot foresee the 
consequences of their actions, and cannot, therefore, make a reasonable choice between different 
alternatives. 
 
Admittedly, there is a certain vagueness and uncertainty in American values. Is this due to our 
inability to think and reason with logical acuity? Americans, especially, are a divided and diverse 
people. Obviously, there is a pragmatic need for identifying the value touchstones that support 
democracy and flesh out their moral foundations. Teachers may require “re-education” to do this 
successfully, but it’s a task worth pursuing. Objectivity in this re-assessment is difficult, but reason, 
dialogue, tolerance, and even civil dissent remain its moral prerequisites. Without these, freedom, 
liberty, and human rights have no chance of permeating our personal lives and political processes. 
Socialization is an important educative process; this can’t be over emphasized. Education, at 
any level, is a normative experience. It is value-based as it focuses on civility and democracy and 
challenges learners to understand and apply their values to a wide-range of problems and issues. 
Presumably, many will be challenged to evaluate and understand friendships, relationships, and how 
best to treat others. Given today’s political climate, there are many who are stressed over human 
relationships and national/international entanglements. They are concerned with their future and 
the future of their children. To openly and objectively discuss these issues, no matter the ilk, is not a 
simple task and requires thinking about our behavior and attitudes and addressing those attitudes 
and behaviors that might be morally destructive. Albert Einstein has commented, “The world we 
have created is a product of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking.” 
(Calaprice, 2005)3 In a world overwhelmed with diverse beliefs and morally inconsistent behaviors, 
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change is something we seek. We acknowledge that our relationships with others are as important as 
any scientific discovery believing that cultivating reason and civility is indeed a moral priority. 
Democracy, represented by civil discourse and moral behavior, is an ideal to which we ought 
to strive. Especially important is Bloch’s introduction of the ontological priority of the “not-yet,” of 
becoming, of what might happen sometime in the future. “It is therefore not,” says Dennis J. 
Schmidt his translator, “the static or finished self-identity of concepts but their dynamic relativity to 
other concepts that lets them be meaningful or intelligible” (Bloch 1986, xii).  It is this dynamic 
relativity that is the subject of this dialogue implying a more expansive notion of ethics preferable to 
one that is narrow, legalistic, self-centered, logic-based, and bleak. Ethics, which pursues human 
equality, happiness, and responsibility – which views the self as it views others – cannot be allowed 
to be diminished by a valueless rationality based on unreasonable self-interest or a survival of the 
fitness mentality implied in neo-Darwinian ethics and accepted as a hidden motive behind personal 
or national policies. 
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